Other Considerations. Dahl makes mention of several other general concerns regarding the democratic nature of our constitution (written and unwritten) which he feels should at least become part of the discussion; I will briefly address two in closing. They relate to the nature of our presidential system and to the place of primaries in democratic elections.
Although Dahl states truthfully that the American presidency is almost wholly unique among the democracies of the world, he does not go so far as to directly call it undemocratic. To do so, as he no doubt well knows, would be untrue. He does, however, question the wisdom of maintaining such a system in which the roles of chief executive and head of state are combined in a single individual. Although I understand Dahl's misgivings, I believe that the American presidency has become so firmly ingrained into our national and political culture that any attempt to alter or abolish it would be not simply futile, but counter-productive as well. The President of the United States has become a symbol not only of the nation, but of the ideal of a democratic government that is at once strong and limited. In my mind, the idea of a separate head of state makes no sense for America. It is understandable in nations such as the U.K., where centuries of monarchy have provided a head of state that can be seen as both legitimate and relevant. But in the U.S., a separate head of state, having neither political power nor historical relevance, would be viewed as without purpose, and thus fail to serve as a symbol of national unity and pride, which is in large part the reason for the existence of such an office.
A final recommendation which I will mention, related to the idea of opportunity and campaign finance, addresses the system of voting primaries. Although they may be viewed as democratic in a strict sense, I must conclude otherwise. By virtue of their cost both to citizens and government, their tendency to cause inter-party strife, and the possibility that they provide to allow for the nomination of a candidate that is not representative of the majority of party voters, I believe that they are a detriment to democracy. Accordingly, I would generally call for the abolishment of primaries, or at the least a stated limit to their scope.
Conclusion. These preceding posts have addressed several aspects of the U.S. Constitution and American political culture which, I feel, could be improved upon from a democratic standpoint. Although I believe our constitution to be an incredible and historic document, it is intended to be, as Dahl states, “an instrument of democratic government – nothing more, nothing less” (39). As such, it should and must be scrutinized by every generation which cares about the implementation of true democratic principles in American society.
12 June 2008
Forum Posting
In response to Constitutional Proposals Part IV: Proportional Representation in the House, Wilf Day writes:
A proportional system for the House of Representatives need not reduce the level of regionally specific representation, if elected state-by-state, as I assume they would be. Indeed, with a 5% threshold California could elect at-large representatives proportionally in two districts.
You have not specified whether at-large representatives would be calculated as "compensatory" (to top-up the single-district results) or in parallel with the district results. The parallel system, used in Japan but not in Europe, gives a voters for a party who have elected more than their share of single-district representatives, and are therefore over-represented, still more congressional representatives, for no obvious reason. I assume, therefore, that you propose a compensatory calculation, but it would be clearer to say so.
Rob Scot writes:
Thank you for your contribution, and for allowing me to clarify my position. I am not familiar with the term compensatory in this context, but I believe I understand your point. In a system which seeks to combine both majoritarian and proportional elections in order to utilize the benefits of both, it seems most appropriate to have the proportional seats "compensate" for any inequality which may have been manifested by the majoritarian, or single-member district, elections. In other words, after the single-district direct elections have been tallied, the remaining seats are appointed by party based upon a second, general vote that will reflect voter demographics; the results of this second, proportional vote will serve to more fairly balance the representation. In this way, the benefits of majoritarianism via direct elections (i.e. simpler political process for voters and politicians, greater accountability to voters) are combined with the benefits of proportionalism (greater fairness and political equality in representation).
A proportional system for the House of Representatives need not reduce the level of regionally specific representation, if elected state-by-state, as I assume they would be. Indeed, with a 5% threshold California could elect at-large representatives proportionally in two districts.
You have not specified whether at-large representatives would be calculated as "compensatory" (to top-up the single-district results) or in parallel with the district results. The parallel system, used in Japan but not in Europe, gives a voters for a party who have elected more than their share of single-district representatives, and are therefore over-represented, still more congressional representatives, for no obvious reason. I assume, therefore, that you propose a compensatory calculation, but it would be clearer to say so.
Rob Scot writes:
Thank you for your contribution, and for allowing me to clarify my position. I am not familiar with the term compensatory in this context, but I believe I understand your point. In a system which seeks to combine both majoritarian and proportional elections in order to utilize the benefits of both, it seems most appropriate to have the proportional seats "compensate" for any inequality which may have been manifested by the majoritarian, or single-member district, elections. In other words, after the single-district direct elections have been tallied, the remaining seats are appointed by party based upon a second, general vote that will reflect voter demographics; the results of this second, proportional vote will serve to more fairly balance the representation. In this way, the benefits of majoritarianism via direct elections (i.e. simpler political process for voters and politicians, greater accountability to voters) are combined with the benefits of proportionalism (greater fairness and political equality in representation).
10 June 2008
Constitutional Proposals Part IV: Proportional Representaion in the House
Dahl takes issue with what he calls the “American hybrid,” that is, a constitution which is neither strongly majoritarian (by virtue of multiple majorities in a system of checks and balances) and yet has little consensual or proportional aspects to it; in fact, it “may possess the advantages of neither and the defects of both” types of systems (115). With regards to the first charge about the weakness of American majoritarianism, I am inclined to disagree with Dahl. I believe the American system of checks and balances as laid out in our present constitution is both democratic and practical, and Dahl himself admits that “the evidence is mixed” regarding the efficiency or inefficiency of such a system (111). With regards to the second charge about a lack of proportionality under our present constitution, I must agree that the single district, winner-take-all method of election, most notably in the U.S. House of Representatives, is neither very fair nor democratic. To rectify this problem, I would support the implementation of a system which combines proportional representation with single member districts, as suggested by Dahl.
The reason for such a combination is rooted in the idea that the elected members of the House are representatives, that they are inclined to more or less act on the behalf of the citizens back in their district who elected them. This is something of a hallmark of American government, as I believe it should be. A proportional system, for all its advantages of political equality, greatly reduces the level of regionally specific representation. For these reasons, a combination of the two may be most appropriate for our federal nation. In such a system, half of the seats in the House would be occupied by members elected by majorities in single-member districts, thus satisfying the representative aspect. The other half of the seats would be filled by party nominees, based proportionally upon the voting results from the election, ensuring that minority voters would be fairly represented in the House even if they lost in the single-member district elections, and thus satisfying the political equality aspect.
It should be noted that a criticism of proportional representation is that it is impractical and inefficient for a society which lacks a strong common culture, whether ethnic, religious, geographic, etc. I believe this is a fair criticism, and in a nation such as the U.S. is worthy of consideration. However, I also believe that a critic could logically predict that a two-party system, such as we now possess, is apt to strong discontent and eventual upheaval. And yet, American politicians for over two centuries have maintained a strong government under a two-party system. They have done this by forming coalitions within their own parties and with members of the opposition, and by the successful utilization of compromise, that vital element of any democracy. For this reason, I believe that a proportional system could be made to work in the U.S., for though Americans do indeed lack a common ethnic, religious, and geographic heritage, we possess a great political heritage.
A final note on proportional representation: given the very real possibility of single-issue or radical parties preventing efficiency in the legislature (another justified criticism), there should be a minimum threshold above which a party must rise in order to seat a candidate. For the sake of efficiency and as a bulwark against minority radicalism, I would propose that this threshold be set rather high, at a minimum of 5%, at least.
The reason for such a combination is rooted in the idea that the elected members of the House are representatives, that they are inclined to more or less act on the behalf of the citizens back in their district who elected them. This is something of a hallmark of American government, as I believe it should be. A proportional system, for all its advantages of political equality, greatly reduces the level of regionally specific representation. For these reasons, a combination of the two may be most appropriate for our federal nation. In such a system, half of the seats in the House would be occupied by members elected by majorities in single-member districts, thus satisfying the representative aspect. The other half of the seats would be filled by party nominees, based proportionally upon the voting results from the election, ensuring that minority voters would be fairly represented in the House even if they lost in the single-member district elections, and thus satisfying the political equality aspect.
It should be noted that a criticism of proportional representation is that it is impractical and inefficient for a society which lacks a strong common culture, whether ethnic, religious, geographic, etc. I believe this is a fair criticism, and in a nation such as the U.S. is worthy of consideration. However, I also believe that a critic could logically predict that a two-party system, such as we now possess, is apt to strong discontent and eventual upheaval. And yet, American politicians for over two centuries have maintained a strong government under a two-party system. They have done this by forming coalitions within their own parties and with members of the opposition, and by the successful utilization of compromise, that vital element of any democracy. For this reason, I believe that a proportional system could be made to work in the U.S., for though Americans do indeed lack a common ethnic, religious, and geographic heritage, we possess a great political heritage.
A final note on proportional representation: given the very real possibility of single-issue or radical parties preventing efficiency in the legislature (another justified criticism), there should be a minimum threshold above which a party must rise in order to seat a candidate. For the sake of efficiency and as a bulwark against minority radicalism, I would propose that this threshold be set rather high, at a minimum of 5%, at least.
19 April 2008
Forum Posting
In response to Constitutional Proposals Part III: The Judiciary, hercules mulligan writes:
Now such an amendment doesn't sound like such a bad idea! I think that it's about time the judiciary was put back in its place.I am not aware, however, of any place in the Constitution that gives the Supreme Court the power of "judicial review" per se; I remember that the question of giving the judiciary taht power did come up during the Constitutional Convention, but they did not give the judicial branch that power, nor did they necessarily forbid it. I think that it is a concept that has grown over the years, and has been taken to extremities thanks to 20th century revisionism.
Now such an amendment doesn't sound like such a bad idea! I think that it's about time the judiciary was put back in its place.I am not aware, however, of any place in the Constitution that gives the Supreme Court the power of "judicial review" per se; I remember that the question of giving the judiciary taht power did come up during the Constitutional Convention, but they did not give the judicial branch that power, nor did they necessarily forbid it. I think that it is a concept that has grown over the years, and has been taken to extremities thanks to 20th century revisionism.
15 March 2008
Constitutional Proposals Part III: The Judiciary
Continuing my critique of our Constitution as a tool of government, I proceed now to the issue of the judiciary. Dahl points out the power of the federal judiciary in what has developed as judicial review as being, in essence, “judicial legislation” or policy-making (19). Although there is an apparent, even critical, benefit to having a judiciary with the jurisdiction to review laws for the purpose of assuring their constitutionality, it is, as Dahl notes, a rather undemocratic notion that a group of nine individuals, appointed (not elected) for life, has the authority to “declare as unconstitutional laws that (have) been properly passed by Congress and signed by the president” (18). In order to amend for this constitutional deficiency, I propose the following.
I do not see a need to change the basic structure and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary. Nor do I propose the abolishing of judicial review, but rather, simply a limit to the scope of its power. I believe, as Dahl suggests, that the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare as unconstitutional laws which impinge upon the most basic tenants of democratic belief and practice, such as the protection of rights and civil liberties, political equality, universal suffrage, etc. However, in a departure from current judicial precedence and practice, I would propose a constitutional amendment limiting binding decisions by the Supreme Court to cases in which there is unanimity among the ruling justices and constitutionality is clearly threatened (that is, a unanimous court may bindingly rule a law unconstitutional only by demonstration that it is so according to the strict construction of the constitution). This is not to say that the court can not rule upon laws in which constitutionality is vague or in which there is not unanimity among the justices. The difference would be that in such cases, the court's decision would be non-binding. A non-binding decision would serve the purpose of calling attention to an issue which the court deemed as being unconstitutional. Following such a ruling, if there was in fact broad consensus in the media, among politicians, and in the general public, then there would be a strong likelihood of the measure in question being overturned, via the democratic procedure. By the same token, the likelihood of rulings leading to the repeal of laws that are generally accepted as being constitutional would be almost non-existent, while judicial policy-making would be practically impossible.
I do not see a need to change the basic structure and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary. Nor do I propose the abolishing of judicial review, but rather, simply a limit to the scope of its power. I believe, as Dahl suggests, that the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare as unconstitutional laws which impinge upon the most basic tenants of democratic belief and practice, such as the protection of rights and civil liberties, political equality, universal suffrage, etc. However, in a departure from current judicial precedence and practice, I would propose a constitutional amendment limiting binding decisions by the Supreme Court to cases in which there is unanimity among the ruling justices and constitutionality is clearly threatened (that is, a unanimous court may bindingly rule a law unconstitutional only by demonstration that it is so according to the strict construction of the constitution). This is not to say that the court can not rule upon laws in which constitutionality is vague or in which there is not unanimity among the justices. The difference would be that in such cases, the court's decision would be non-binding. A non-binding decision would serve the purpose of calling attention to an issue which the court deemed as being unconstitutional. Following such a ruling, if there was in fact broad consensus in the media, among politicians, and in the general public, then there would be a strong likelihood of the measure in question being overturned, via the democratic procedure. By the same token, the likelihood of rulings leading to the repeal of laws that are generally accepted as being constitutional would be almost non-existent, while judicial policy-making would be practically impossible.
12 February 2008
A Humble Tribute to the Man Who Saved the Union
It seems appropriate on this day, the birthday of our 17th President, to draw attention to the fact that The Federalist, that collaborative work which has for 220 years epitomized the eloquent defense of our Constitution and all its values, begins first and foremost with a rationale that that document should be accepted based on the assertion that a Union of the several states would be in every manner superior to a group of confederacies or independent republics. Publius was able to convince his readers of this fact in 1787-88, but by the middle of the next century an entire region of the United Stated was openly challenging this assertion. It fell to another man to do the convincing, and regrettably, by that point the issue was beyond being settled by well-crafted essays; the only recourse left open to him was war.
Abraham Lincoln was not a popular president; he was loathed in the South, and hated by more than a few in the North as well. His tenure was fraught with the most trying circumstance immaginable, a civil war, from the moment of his inauguration. Yet Lincoln never wavered in his firm conviction that, above all, THE UNION MUST BE PRESERVED. It would ultimately cost him his life.
In The Federalist No. 2, John Jay writes, "I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly forseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet, 'Farewell! A long Farewell to all my Greatness!'" Linclon did indeed foresee that reality, at a time when many did not. For that, he is deserving of the lasting gratitude of his countrymen, of which I am one.
Abraham Lincoln was not a popular president; he was loathed in the South, and hated by more than a few in the North as well. His tenure was fraught with the most trying circumstance immaginable, a civil war, from the moment of his inauguration. Yet Lincoln never wavered in his firm conviction that, above all, THE UNION MUST BE PRESERVED. It would ultimately cost him his life.
In The Federalist No. 2, John Jay writes, "I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly forseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet, 'Farewell! A long Farewell to all my Greatness!'" Linclon did indeed foresee that reality, at a time when many did not. For that, he is deserving of the lasting gratitude of his countrymen, of which I am one.
10 February 2008
Constitutional Proposals Part II: The Senate
Senate Representation. Given the gross misrepresentation of population and political inequality sustained by the U.S. Senate, it is apparent that major changes are in order if we are interested in creating a more democratic constitution. Some may argue that there is no need for a Senate at all, and that our bicameral system is only an impediment to efficiency and an outdated bulwark against true political equality. However, I am inclined to believe that the Senate serves an important duty. As a smaller house than that of the Representatives, it can afford to be more deliberative; by dividing certain aspects of governance between the House and Senate (such as the origination of finance bills and the approval of treaties and executive appointments, respectively), greater specialization is allowed; most importantly, the Senate, if organized in the manner I now propose, can be a more truly national body, not beholden to regional constituencies in the way that the House inevitably must (and should) be.
To prevent the kind of unequal representation which is now present in the Senate, I propose the election of Senators by federal districts based on population. However, in order to avoid back room political bargaining such as gerrymandering, the districts would be organized along permanent state borders. Accordingly, a single-member district would be comprised of several small states, while large states would elect several members by a proportional method, based on their population. Senatorial candidates would be nominated by their respective national party, inevitably allowing for more broad-based and nationally oriented candidates, while also simplifying the election process for both citizens and government, particularly in the multi-member districts.
In case this system seems unclear, take the following as an example. If we allow for the number of Senators to be permanently fixed at fifty (which, I believe, is neither so small as to lack wise counsel, nor so large as to be inefficient), then, with the present U.S. population of approximately 300 million, each senatorial district will be comprised of an approximate population of 6 million. The populations of the states of Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming together equal roughly 6 million, therefore these states would be reckoned as a single federal district, with all citizens within these state borders electing a single Senator. California, however, with a population of just over 36 million, would itself be a multi-member district, in this case electing 6 senators. These candidates for the Californian district, having been placed on the ballot by their respective parties, would then be elected proportionally so as to adequately represent the political demographics of the district. For example, if 65% of California's population is Democratic, and 35% is Republican, than the Democrats would be allotted four seats and the Republicans two.
Finally, as regards the term limits of senators, I see no reason to change the established six-year, rotating terms of office. However, I would alter the current system with regards to residency requirements. Not only would senators not be required to reside in the federal district from which they were elected, but they would be forbidden from running for reelection from the same district by which they currently serve. This, along with nomination by the national party and (in some cases) election from a district encompassing multiple states, would further encourage senators to think in terms of the national welfare, as opposed to seeking to please state and regional constituencies. In sum, such a Senate would provide for a democratically elected body (as regards the political equality of voters), relatively free to deliberate and legislate on issues of truly national interest as their primary concern.
To prevent the kind of unequal representation which is now present in the Senate, I propose the election of Senators by federal districts based on population. However, in order to avoid back room political bargaining such as gerrymandering, the districts would be organized along permanent state borders. Accordingly, a single-member district would be comprised of several small states, while large states would elect several members by a proportional method, based on their population. Senatorial candidates would be nominated by their respective national party, inevitably allowing for more broad-based and nationally oriented candidates, while also simplifying the election process for both citizens and government, particularly in the multi-member districts.
In case this system seems unclear, take the following as an example. If we allow for the number of Senators to be permanently fixed at fifty (which, I believe, is neither so small as to lack wise counsel, nor so large as to be inefficient), then, with the present U.S. population of approximately 300 million, each senatorial district will be comprised of an approximate population of 6 million. The populations of the states of Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming together equal roughly 6 million, therefore these states would be reckoned as a single federal district, with all citizens within these state borders electing a single Senator. California, however, with a population of just over 36 million, would itself be a multi-member district, in this case electing 6 senators. These candidates for the Californian district, having been placed on the ballot by their respective parties, would then be elected proportionally so as to adequately represent the political demographics of the district. For example, if 65% of California's population is Democratic, and 35% is Republican, than the Democrats would be allotted four seats and the Republicans two.
Finally, as regards the term limits of senators, I see no reason to change the established six-year, rotating terms of office. However, I would alter the current system with regards to residency requirements. Not only would senators not be required to reside in the federal district from which they were elected, but they would be forbidden from running for reelection from the same district by which they currently serve. This, along with nomination by the national party and (in some cases) election from a district encompassing multiple states, would further encourage senators to think in terms of the national welfare, as opposed to seeking to please state and regional constituencies. In sum, such a Senate would provide for a democratically elected body (as regards the political equality of voters), relatively free to deliberate and legislate on issues of truly national interest as their primary concern.
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