Other Considerations. Dahl makes mention of several other general concerns regarding the democratic nature of our constitution (written and unwritten) which he feels should at least become part of the discussion; I will briefly address two in closing. They relate to the nature of our presidential system and to the place of primaries in democratic elections.
Although Dahl states truthfully that the American presidency is almost wholly unique among the democracies of the world, he does not go so far as to directly call it undemocratic. To do so, as he no doubt well knows, would be untrue. He does, however, question the wisdom of maintaining such a system in which the roles of chief executive and head of state are combined in a single individual. Although I understand Dahl's misgivings, I believe that the American presidency has become so firmly ingrained into our national and political culture that any attempt to alter or abolish it would be not simply futile, but counter-productive as well. The President of the United States has become a symbol not only of the nation, but of the ideal of a democratic government that is at once strong and limited. In my mind, the idea of a separate head of state makes no sense for America. It is understandable in nations such as the U.K., where centuries of monarchy have provided a head of state that can be seen as both legitimate and relevant. But in the U.S., a separate head of state, having neither political power nor historical relevance, would be viewed as without purpose, and thus fail to serve as a symbol of national unity and pride, which is in large part the reason for the existence of such an office.
A final recommendation which I will mention, related to the idea of opportunity and campaign finance, addresses the system of voting primaries. Although they may be viewed as democratic in a strict sense, I must conclude otherwise. By virtue of their cost both to citizens and government, their tendency to cause inter-party strife, and the possibility that they provide to allow for the nomination of a candidate that is not representative of the majority of party voters, I believe that they are a detriment to democracy. Accordingly, I would generally call for the abolishment of primaries, or at the least a stated limit to their scope.
Conclusion. These preceding posts have addressed several aspects of the U.S. Constitution and American political culture which, I feel, could be improved upon from a democratic standpoint. Although I believe our constitution to be an incredible and historic document, it is intended to be, as Dahl states, “an instrument of democratic government – nothing more, nothing less” (39). As such, it should and must be scrutinized by every generation which cares about the implementation of true democratic principles in American society.
12 June 2008
Forum Posting
In response to Constitutional Proposals Part IV: Proportional Representation in the House, Wilf Day writes:
A proportional system for the House of Representatives need not reduce the level of regionally specific representation, if elected state-by-state, as I assume they would be. Indeed, with a 5% threshold California could elect at-large representatives proportionally in two districts.
You have not specified whether at-large representatives would be calculated as "compensatory" (to top-up the single-district results) or in parallel with the district results. The parallel system, used in Japan but not in Europe, gives a voters for a party who have elected more than their share of single-district representatives, and are therefore over-represented, still more congressional representatives, for no obvious reason. I assume, therefore, that you propose a compensatory calculation, but it would be clearer to say so.
Rob Scot writes:
Thank you for your contribution, and for allowing me to clarify my position. I am not familiar with the term compensatory in this context, but I believe I understand your point. In a system which seeks to combine both majoritarian and proportional elections in order to utilize the benefits of both, it seems most appropriate to have the proportional seats "compensate" for any inequality which may have been manifested by the majoritarian, or single-member district, elections. In other words, after the single-district direct elections have been tallied, the remaining seats are appointed by party based upon a second, general vote that will reflect voter demographics; the results of this second, proportional vote will serve to more fairly balance the representation. In this way, the benefits of majoritarianism via direct elections (i.e. simpler political process for voters and politicians, greater accountability to voters) are combined with the benefits of proportionalism (greater fairness and political equality in representation).
A proportional system for the House of Representatives need not reduce the level of regionally specific representation, if elected state-by-state, as I assume they would be. Indeed, with a 5% threshold California could elect at-large representatives proportionally in two districts.
You have not specified whether at-large representatives would be calculated as "compensatory" (to top-up the single-district results) or in parallel with the district results. The parallel system, used in Japan but not in Europe, gives a voters for a party who have elected more than their share of single-district representatives, and are therefore over-represented, still more congressional representatives, for no obvious reason. I assume, therefore, that you propose a compensatory calculation, but it would be clearer to say so.
Rob Scot writes:
Thank you for your contribution, and for allowing me to clarify my position. I am not familiar with the term compensatory in this context, but I believe I understand your point. In a system which seeks to combine both majoritarian and proportional elections in order to utilize the benefits of both, it seems most appropriate to have the proportional seats "compensate" for any inequality which may have been manifested by the majoritarian, or single-member district, elections. In other words, after the single-district direct elections have been tallied, the remaining seats are appointed by party based upon a second, general vote that will reflect voter demographics; the results of this second, proportional vote will serve to more fairly balance the representation. In this way, the benefits of majoritarianism via direct elections (i.e. simpler political process for voters and politicians, greater accountability to voters) are combined with the benefits of proportionalism (greater fairness and political equality in representation).
10 June 2008
Constitutional Proposals Part IV: Proportional Representaion in the House
Dahl takes issue with what he calls the “American hybrid,” that is, a constitution which is neither strongly majoritarian (by virtue of multiple majorities in a system of checks and balances) and yet has little consensual or proportional aspects to it; in fact, it “may possess the advantages of neither and the defects of both” types of systems (115). With regards to the first charge about the weakness of American majoritarianism, I am inclined to disagree with Dahl. I believe the American system of checks and balances as laid out in our present constitution is both democratic and practical, and Dahl himself admits that “the evidence is mixed” regarding the efficiency or inefficiency of such a system (111). With regards to the second charge about a lack of proportionality under our present constitution, I must agree that the single district, winner-take-all method of election, most notably in the U.S. House of Representatives, is neither very fair nor democratic. To rectify this problem, I would support the implementation of a system which combines proportional representation with single member districts, as suggested by Dahl.
The reason for such a combination is rooted in the idea that the elected members of the House are representatives, that they are inclined to more or less act on the behalf of the citizens back in their district who elected them. This is something of a hallmark of American government, as I believe it should be. A proportional system, for all its advantages of political equality, greatly reduces the level of regionally specific representation. For these reasons, a combination of the two may be most appropriate for our federal nation. In such a system, half of the seats in the House would be occupied by members elected by majorities in single-member districts, thus satisfying the representative aspect. The other half of the seats would be filled by party nominees, based proportionally upon the voting results from the election, ensuring that minority voters would be fairly represented in the House even if they lost in the single-member district elections, and thus satisfying the political equality aspect.
It should be noted that a criticism of proportional representation is that it is impractical and inefficient for a society which lacks a strong common culture, whether ethnic, religious, geographic, etc. I believe this is a fair criticism, and in a nation such as the U.S. is worthy of consideration. However, I also believe that a critic could logically predict that a two-party system, such as we now possess, is apt to strong discontent and eventual upheaval. And yet, American politicians for over two centuries have maintained a strong government under a two-party system. They have done this by forming coalitions within their own parties and with members of the opposition, and by the successful utilization of compromise, that vital element of any democracy. For this reason, I believe that a proportional system could be made to work in the U.S., for though Americans do indeed lack a common ethnic, religious, and geographic heritage, we possess a great political heritage.
A final note on proportional representation: given the very real possibility of single-issue or radical parties preventing efficiency in the legislature (another justified criticism), there should be a minimum threshold above which a party must rise in order to seat a candidate. For the sake of efficiency and as a bulwark against minority radicalism, I would propose that this threshold be set rather high, at a minimum of 5%, at least.
The reason for such a combination is rooted in the idea that the elected members of the House are representatives, that they are inclined to more or less act on the behalf of the citizens back in their district who elected them. This is something of a hallmark of American government, as I believe it should be. A proportional system, for all its advantages of political equality, greatly reduces the level of regionally specific representation. For these reasons, a combination of the two may be most appropriate for our federal nation. In such a system, half of the seats in the House would be occupied by members elected by majorities in single-member districts, thus satisfying the representative aspect. The other half of the seats would be filled by party nominees, based proportionally upon the voting results from the election, ensuring that minority voters would be fairly represented in the House even if they lost in the single-member district elections, and thus satisfying the political equality aspect.
It should be noted that a criticism of proportional representation is that it is impractical and inefficient for a society which lacks a strong common culture, whether ethnic, religious, geographic, etc. I believe this is a fair criticism, and in a nation such as the U.S. is worthy of consideration. However, I also believe that a critic could logically predict that a two-party system, such as we now possess, is apt to strong discontent and eventual upheaval. And yet, American politicians for over two centuries have maintained a strong government under a two-party system. They have done this by forming coalitions within their own parties and with members of the opposition, and by the successful utilization of compromise, that vital element of any democracy. For this reason, I believe that a proportional system could be made to work in the U.S., for though Americans do indeed lack a common ethnic, religious, and geographic heritage, we possess a great political heritage.
A final note on proportional representation: given the very real possibility of single-issue or radical parties preventing efficiency in the legislature (another justified criticism), there should be a minimum threshold above which a party must rise in order to seat a candidate. For the sake of efficiency and as a bulwark against minority radicalism, I would propose that this threshold be set rather high, at a minimum of 5%, at least.
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